Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law
Journal
Volume 30 XXX
Number 2

Article 3

2020

Fame: Ownership Implications of Intellectual Property and Agency
Law
Max Stul Oppenheimer
University of Baltimore School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Max Stul Oppenheimer, Fame: Ownership Implications of Intellectual Property and Agency Law, 30
Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 447 (2020).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol30/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information,
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

Fame: Ownership Implications of Intellectual Property and Agency Law
Cover Page Footnote
B.S., cum laude, Princeton University; J.D., Harvard Law School; Professor of Law, University of Baltimore
School of Law; member, National Academy of Television Arts and Sciences. The author would like to
thank Louis Angelos, League Representative, Baltimore Orioles, for his comments on the manuscript,
Rebecca Oppenheimer of Andalman and Flynn for her suggestions on the entertainment sections and for
lending her encyclopedic knowledge of movies, and Hayley Hassan, UB ‘19 and Julia Anne McKeachie, UB
‘20 for their extraordinary research assistance. The views expressed are the author’s own.

This article is available in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal:
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol30/iss2/3

Fame: Ownership Implications of
Intellectual Property and Agency Law
Max Stul Oppenheimer*
In the pre-internet era, it was difficult to reach a wide audience
without the help of a professional organization, so as a practical
matter control typically rested with distributors rather than with
talent. Now that direct public distribution is easy and inexpensive,
distributors’ practical control has greatly diminished, and it is
therefore important to consider the legal principles that govern the
control of the use of “fame.” This Article defines fame as a bundle
of intellectual property rights and analyzes the ownership of those
rights under intellectual property and agency theories.

*

B.S., cum laude, Princeton University; J.D., Harvard Law School; Professor of Law,
University of Baltimore School of Law; member, National Academy of Television Arts
and Sciences. The author would like to thank Louis Angelos, League Representative,
Baltimore Orioles, for his comments on the manuscript, Rebecca Oppenheimer of
Andalman and Flynn for her suggestions on the entertainment sections and for lending her
encyclopedic knowledge of movies, and Hayley Hassan, UB ‘19 and Julia Anne
McKeachie, UB ‘20 for their extraordinary research assistance. The views expressed are
the author’s own.

447

448

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. XXX:447

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................... 449
I. DEFINING FAME ................................................... 452
II. A PROPOSED LEGAL FRAMEWORK ....................... 455
III. THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMPONENTS OF
FAME ................................................................... 457
A. Trademarks .................................................... 457
1. The Rights of a Trademark Owner .......... 458
2. Ownership of Trademarks ....................... 459
B. Copyright ....................................................... 461
1. The Rights of a Copyright Owner ........... 463
2. The Ownership of Copyrights ................. 464
C. Patents ............................................................ 465
1. The Rights of a Patent Owner ................. 466
2. Ownership of Patents............................... 466
D. Trade Secrets.................................................. 467
1. The Rights of a Trade Secret Owner ....... 468
2. Ownership of Trade Secrets .................... 469
E. State Rights: The Right of Privacy and the Right
of Publicity ..................................................... 469
IV. RECONCILING OWNERSHIP: THE BLOCKING NATURE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS .................. 472
V. THE AGENCY COMPLICATION .............................. 473
A. The Nature of Agency ..................................... 473
B. The Power of the Agent .................................. 475
C. Fiduciary Duties of the Agent ........................ 476
D. The Principal’s Rights ................................... 479
E. The Agency Issue in Fame ............................. 482
VI. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS AND SAMPLE
APPLICATIONS...................................................... 484
A. Inherent Fame ................................................ 485
B. Self-Developed Fame ..................................... 485
C. Assisted Fame ................................................ 485
D. Group Fame ................................................... 487
E. Fungible Fame ............................................... 487
VII. APPLICATION ....................................................... 487
CONCLUSION......................................................................... 491

2020]

FAME

449

INTRODUCTION
A professional football player kneels during the National
Anthem in order to draw attention to a cause that he personally
believes in.1 Our initial reaction is “First Amendment,” or maybe
the more subtle “symbolic speech . . . First Amendment.”2 A
1

See Steve Wyche, Colin Kaepernick Explains Why He Sat During the National
Anthem, NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE (Aug. 27, 2016, 10:04 AM), http://www.nfl.com/news/
story/0ap3000000691077/article/colin-kaepernick-explains-why-he-sat-during-nationalanthem [https://perma.cc/FRJ6-6JHB]. While the most recent high-profile example, Mr.
Kaepernick was not the only, or even the first, performer to use the platform provided by
their performance to promote a personal belief. In the 1968 Olympics, American gold and
bronze medalist sprinters Tommie Smith and John Carlos raised their fists during the
National Anthem at their award ceremony. See, e.g., Ben Cosgrove, The Black Power
Salute That Rocked the 1968 Olympics, TIME (Sept. 27, 2014), https://time.com/
3880999/black-power-salute-tommie-smith-and-john-carlos-at-the-1968-olympics/
[https://perma.cc/ESN4-384W]. Boxer George Foreman waived an American flag after
winning his gold medal. See Meet George—Biography, OFFICIAL WEBSITE GEORGE
FOREMAN, https://www.georgeforeman.com/pages/biography [https://perma.cc/VK2LMPFX]. In 1996, basketball player Mahmoud Abdul-Rauf initially refused to stand for the
National Anthem because of religious beliefs. He then “negotiated a fast truce with the
league, acquiescing to its rule requiring players to stand for the anthem in an acceptable
posture—while also cupping his hands and bowing his head in adherence to his Muslim
faith.” See Harvey Araton, From the N.B.A., a Cautionary Tale on National Anthem
Protests, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/sports/basket
ball/anthem-nba-abdul-rauf-kaepernick.html [https://perma.cc/D2UA-8UGM]. During the
2004 season, Toronto Blue Jays first baseman Carlos Delgado protested the invasion of
Iraq by remaining in the dugout rather than stand when “God Bless America” was played
at major league games during the seventh inning stretch after the 9/11 attack. See William
C. Rhoden, Delgado Makes a Stand by Taking a Seat, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2004),
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/21/sports/sports-of-the-times-delgado-makes-a-standby-taking-a-seat.html [https://perma.cc/QXJ9-Z2CV]. Mr. Delgado was not, however,
seeking publicity: “I’m not trying to get anyone mad, he said . . . . This is my personal
feeling. I don’t want to draw attention to myself or go out of my way to protest. If I make
the last out of the seventh inning, I’ll stand there. But I’d rather be in the dugout.” Id. Even
earlier, the singing group Dixie Chicks had used a performance to promote personal views.
See David Segal, Dixie Chicks Bare Their, Uh, Souls, WASH. POST (Apr. 25, 2003),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/lifestyle/2003/04/25/dixie-chicks-bare-theiruh-souls/d926396e-603d-4ae8-87a0-5bb041193b9b/
[https://perma.cc/L2EK-5MM9].
The Tampa Bay Buccaneers’ Mike Evans also took a knee during the national anthem. See
Michal Addady, Another NFL Player Takes a Knee to Protest Donald Trump’s Victory,
FORTUNE (Nov. 14, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/11/14/donald-trump-mike-evanstampa-bay-buccaneers/ [https://perma.cc/ZG79-KNW6]. “He explained that he did so to
express disappointment in the U.S. for electing a reality television star to lead the country,
saying it’s ‘not a good look for America.’” Id.
2
See W.Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (establishing a
constitutional right not to salute the flag); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
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moment’s thought reminds us that the First Amendment does not
generally authorize all speech by all people in all contexts—it only
constrains government interference with speech.3 More specifically,
the First Amendment rarely authorizes using property that belongs
to someone else.4 Imagine that one of the groundskeepers shares the
same personal beliefs regarding the same cause. Realizing that there
would be no media coverage of a groundskeeper kneeling during the
National Anthem, he instead spray-paints “End Injustice” in
ten-foot-tall letters on the stadium. Should our initial reaction be the
same in that case? This Article explores that question by examining
the concept of fame from a legal perspective.
Fame has always been valuable. However, fame as an asset has
changed; not only has it increased in value,5 but it has changed in
nature.6 Fame has become both more widely accessible and more

Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (establishing a constitutional right to wear an armband
showing support of a cause in violation of a school dress code); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 419 (1989) (establishing a constitutional right to burn a flag as a protest).
3
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The 14th Amendment extended the limitation to state
action. See generally Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
4
See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad., 433 U.S. 562, 564 (1977). Scripps-Howard
had broadcast the entirety of Zacchini’s “human cannonball” performance on local news.
Id. at 563. The Supreme Court held that the broadcast violated Zacchini’s right of publicity
and was not protected by the First or Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 578–79. The analysis
that follows ignores contractual agreements; in most cases, famous performers and athletes
will be subject to contract terms and league requirements that either authorize or constrain
many of the activities considered below.
5
See, e.g., Bill Shaikin, A Look at How Major League Baseball Salaries Have Grown
More Than 20,000% the Last 50 Years, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2016, 6:23 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/sports/mlb/la-sp-mlb-salaries-chart-20160329-story.html
[https://perma.cc/CVD5-G5T6].
6
The phenomenon predates the internet. Writing in the television era, Malcolm
Muggeridge observed, “[i]n the past if someone was famous or notorious, it was for
something—as a writer or an actor or a criminal; for some talent or distinction or
abomination. Today one is famous for being famous.” MALCOLM MUGGERIDGE,
MUGGERIDGE THROUGH THE MICROPHONE 7 (1969). However, the internet has made it
easier, cheaper and faster to become “famous for being famous” and that phrase has come
to be “[s]aid of someone who is well-known only for being a fixture in the media, rather
than having a particular talent or achievement.” Famous, FREE DICTIONARY,
https://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/famous+for+being+famous [https://perma.cc/98L3HTS7].
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directly accessible.7 Historically, famous artists and performers
clearly benefitted economically from fame; fame increased attention
and, therefore, the value of the activity for which they were famous.
Especially where fame was a function of skill, increased fame
resulted in increased recognition of that skill and its value. Recently,
however, fame has developed into an asset,8 independent of the
underlying activity that created the fame, and transferable
to other fields.9
This Article explores two related questions: “what is fame?” and
“who owns it?”10 These questions have grown in importance in

7

For example, internet broadcasting has reduced the need for intermediaries and
allowed direct access to followers and fans. As of September 2019 Barack Obama and Katy
Perry each had about 108 million Twitter followers, and Justin Bieber had about 106
million. J. Clement, Most Followed Accounts on Twitter 2019, STATISTA (Sept. 2, 2019),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/273172/twitter-accounts-with-the-most-followersworldwide/ [https://perma.cc/ALY4-3SLF]. As of November 2019, Cristiano Ronaldo had
188 million Instagram followers. List of Most-Followed Instagram Accounts, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_most-followed_Instagram_accounts
[https://perma.cc/6FES-3EHU]. By comparison, the top Nielsen-rated TV show for the
week of October 21, 2019 had a “10.4 share,” equivalent to about 18 million viewers. See
generally Top 10, NIELSEN, https://www.nielsen.com/us/en/top-ten/ [https://perma.cc/
AXQ9-QXYA]. And attendance for Gone with the Wind, among the highest all-time box
office movies, was about 225 million. Patricia Bauer, Gone with the Wind, ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Gone-with-the-Wind-film-by-Fleming
[https://perma.cc/ZG5H-YBEW]; see also Robert Munafo, All-Time Top 232 Movies by
U.S. Theatre Attendance, MROB, https://www.mrob.com/pub/film-video/topadj.html
[https://perma.cc/XE64-CB9L].
8
In financial terminology, an “asset” is any resource that has economic value and that
is owned or controlled. See Asset, INVESTOPEDIA (May 3, 2019), https://www.invest
opedia.com/terms/a/asset.asp [https://perma.cc/8MRJ-QPTK]. Note that the definition
does not require that an asset be physical, as for example intellectual property rights. See,
e.g., Intellectual Property, MICROSOFT, https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/legal/
intellectualproperty/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/GXK6-WRJ8] (“Intellectual property
(IP) is a strategic asset that provides significant value to Microsoft and its customer and
partners.”).
9
See, e.g., Alissa Schulman, Studios Are Now Looking for Actors Who Are InstaFamous, N.Y. POST, (May 27, 2018, 9:31 AM), https://nypost.com/2018/05/27/studiosare-now-looking-for-actors-who-are-insta-famous/
[https://perma.cc/38WA-ZD7V]
(“Actresses are now saying, ‘I have 1 million followers. If you employ me in a film, I can
guarantee 1 million people.’”)
10
In many cases, the issues posed in this Article are resolved by contract (for example,
broadcast rights or the right to wear character costumes or team uniforms), but some rights
cannot be completely resolved by contract, for example copyright reversionary rights. See
infra note 88 and accompanying text.
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recent years, as the economics of fame has shifted. Fame has
increasingly come to be valued independently from underlying
achievements—it is pursued, admired, coveted, and marketed as
something highly desirable in itself.11 Fame on its own is now a very
valuable asset.
Section I of this Article surveys the available legal definitions of
“fame” and, finding little available authority, expands the survey to
include lay definitions. Section II then explores legal frameworks
suitable for characterizing fame and the mechanisms for protecting
it. This section concludes that fame is, in fact, a collection of
intellectual property rights. Section III then analyzes each type of
intellectual property making up that collection and explores how the
characteristics of each component contribute to the definition and
protection of fame. Section IV looks at the question of ownership
and control of fame, both element by element and as a collection of
elements. Of special note will be issues that arise when ownership
claims to different elements of fame come into conflict. Section V
then explores a complication that arises under agency law, primarily
the duty of an agent to account to a principal for opportunities
arising by virtue of the agency relationship. Finally, Section VI
provides an analytical framework and applies it to examples of
specific types of fame.
I. DEFINING FAME
In defining any legal concept, a logical first step is to identify
statutes that provide an explicit definition. For a status that is so
highly valued and sought after, the statutory treatment of “fame” is
surprisingly sparse and ambiguous. No state statutes define the
terms “fame” or “famous.”12 Only one federal statute comes close:
the Lanham Trademark Act.13 This federal statute defines “famous”
but not “fame,” and only does so in the limited context of according

11

See Schulman, supra note 9.
There are state statutes defining the arguably allied concept of a right to publicity. See
infra note 117 and accompanying text.
13
See generally Lanham Act (Trademark Act of 1946), Pub. L. No. 79–489, 60 Stat.
427 (1946) (codified in scattered section of 15 U.S.C.).
12
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special rights14 to owners of “famous” trademarks.15 Under the
Lanham Act, an owner of a famous trademark, in addition to
possessing the right of all trademark owners to prevent the use of
confusingly similar trademarks, may obtain an injunction to prevent
“tarnishment” of the famous mark “regardless of the presence or
absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual
economic injury.”16
The statute establishes factors to be considered in determining
whether a trademark is famous:
[T]he duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner or third parties.
The amount, volume, and geographic extent of sales
of goods or services offered under the mark.
The extent of actual recognition of the mark.
Whether the mark was registered under the Act of
March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or
on the principal register.17
However, the statute also provides that “[i]n determining
whether a mark possesses the requisite degree of recognition, the
court may consider all relevant factors . . . .”18 This vague and
expansive provision ultimately results in the statute leaving the term
“famous”—much less “fame”—largely undefined. Courts have
tended to fill this gap by equating “famous” with sales volume or
advertising expenditures.19 While this approach might have been
14

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2018).
The statute defines famous trademarks as those which are “widely recognized by the
general consuming public of the United States.” Id. § 1125(c)(2)(A).
16
Id. § 1125(c)(1).
17
Id. § 1125(c)(2)(A).
18
Id. See infra Section III for further discussion of trademark law and its application to
fame.
19
See Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (“The fame of a mark may be measured indirectly, among other things, by the
volume of sales and advertising expenditures, and by the length of time those indicia of
commercial awareness have been evident.”); see also Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods.,
Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“We have consistently accepted statistics of
sales and advertising as indicia of fame: when the numbers are large, we have tended to
accept them without any further supporting proof.”). For examples of the scale involved,
see, e.g., Nina Ricci, S.A.R.L. v. E.T.F. Enters., Inc., 889 F.2d 1070, 1072 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
15
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reasonable in the pre-internet economy, it ignores the substantial
publicity that is now available at no cost through outlets such as
Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and Instagram. This approach also
assumes that advertising expenditures are effective.20
Despite these problems, the formulation “widely recognized”
makes a certain amount of sense in a trademark context. Because
trademarks are intended to prevent consumer confusion,21 consumer
recognition is an appropriate basis on which to define fame in the
trademark context. The issue in terms of agency duties is much
broader, involving determinations of ownership and use of a variety
of intellectual property rights. In other legal contexts that are not
inherently consumer-focused, the formulation “widely recognized”
would be even more problematic.
In the absence of a statutory definition, we might look to lay
definitions and then attempt to fit them into appropriate legal
pigeonholes. Unfortunately, dictionary definitions provide little
help. Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary merely defines fame as
“public estimation or popular acclaim,”22 and other dictionaries do
not reveal much more.23
(NINA RICCI deemed famous for perfume, clothing and accessories because of $200
million in sales, over $37 million in advertising over 27 years); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v.
H. Douglas Enter., Ltd., 774 F.2d 1144, 1146–47 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (HUGGIES famous for
diapers because of over $300 million in sales over 9 years, $15 million in advertising in
one year).
20
George Bradt, Wanamaker Was Wrong—The Vast Majority of Advertising Is Wasted,
FORBES (Sept. 14, 2016), forbes.com/sites/georgebradt/2016/09/14/wanamaker-waswrong-the-vast-majority-of-advertising-is-wasted/#1fe98a2f483b
[https://perma.cc/
TWZ9-NA7V] (“Nineteenth-century Philadelphia retailer John Wanamaker supposedly
said ‘Half the money I spend on advertising is wasted; the trouble is I don’t know which
half.’”).
21
See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2018).
22
Fame, MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fame
[https://perma.cc/D4CY-73R6].
23
See Fame, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/
67941?rskey=oH4fMQ&result=1#eid [https://perma.cc/QJ3U-U9WA] (defining fame (in
the sense used in this Article) as “2a. The character attributed to a person or thing by report
or generally entertained; reputation. Usually in good sense,” or “3a. The condition of being
much talked about. Chiefly in good sense: Reputation derived from great achievements;
celebrity, honour, renown”); Fame, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/
browse/fame [https://perma.cc/W6A3-RGKF] (defining fame as “widespread reputation,
especially of a favorable character; renown; public eminence . . . .” or “common estimation
or opinion generally held of a person or thing; reputation”).
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In sum, there is no widely applicable legal definition of “fame.”
The Trademark Act’s definition provides only an indirect, ex post
definition of fame once it has been achieved. Yet the Trademark
Act’s definition does at least provide a framework in which to
examine fame as a collection of legally cognizable components that
go into achieving the status of being famous. For the purposes of the
analysis here, the Trademark Act seems to represent an acceptable
(and, in any event, the best available) framework in which to view
fame. As a working definition, this Article will use a slight
modification of the Trademark Act’s definition: this Article
considers fame to be acquired when it is widely recognized by a
relevant section of the consuming public. In other words, a person’s
or entity’s fame need not be recognized by the general public in
order for the fame to exist; all that is required is that some segment
of the population—one that counts economically for the particular
situation—recognizes their fame.24
II. A PROPOSED LEGAL FRAMEWORK
In order to be “widely recognized,” and thus come within our
working definition of fame, a person must be distinguishable in
some respect to some relevant market.25 If an individual cannot be
distinguished from others, that individual cannot be famous.
Although the statutes use different words, protecting
“distinguishableness” is the core characteristic of the class of legal
rights known as intellectual property: copyrights prevent copying of
“original” works;26 patents protect “new” inventions;27 trademarks

24
This is the approach taken in trademark cases. See Palm Bay Imps. v. Veuve Clicquot
Ponsardin, 396 F.3d 1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Although this court has not directly
addressed the question of what segment of the consuming public must be aware of a mark
in order for it to be considered famous in a likelihood of confusion analysis, it has indirectly
suggested that a mark’s renown within a specific product market is the proper standard.”).
25
In the trademark context, this is a threshold requirement for protectability under the
Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2018).
26
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018).
27
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2017).
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protect “distinctive” symbols of origin;28 and trade secrets protect
information that is “not generally known.”29
It would seem reasonable, therefore, to place “fame” in the legal
pigeonhole of intellectual property. Accordingly, this Article will
examine the definition of fame as a bundle of rights selected from
the collection of intellectual property rights. Precisely which rights
comprise the bundle will vary depending on the particular
circumstances of each example or set of examples. Although there
is no single IP right that defines fame, fame fits comfortably in the
general category of “intellectual property” because it is an intangible
right and enjoys a zone of exclusivity if, only if, and only to the
extent that, the law recognizes the right.30
Within this broad legal framework, the principal elements are
trademark rights, copyright rights, patent rights, and trade secret
rights.31 Several components that make a famous person32 famous
may be eligible for intellectual property protection. For example, a
person’s name, image, or voice may in itself be a trademark,33 and

28

15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2019); 8 TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE §
1209.01 (2018).
29
Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 529–659 (Supp. 2010).
30
Tangible property inherently creates exclusivity by virtue of the laws of physics:
possession of a tangible object inherently prevents others from taking possession. On the
other hand, intangible property is susceptible to multiple simultaneous ownership unless
constrained by law. For example, downloading a song does not take the song away from
the original owner; what constrains downloading is not the limitation that only one person
can have physical possession at any given time, but the constraint legally imposed by
copyright law. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913 (2005). Absent
that legal constraint, the act of downloading a digital copy is simple and the copy is
indistinguishable from the original. Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018);
31
There are other specialized intellectual property rights which may apply in unusual
cases but do not seem relevant to the general discussion of fame. For example, there is
federal statutory protection for the three-dimensional design of semiconductor mask works,
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901–14 (2018); and for plants,
Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2582 (2018); 35 U.S.C. § 161
(2017).
32
Fame may be associated with an individual, a group of individuals or a legal entity.
For convenience, the term “person” is used to include all of them.
33
See, e.g., Registration No. 916522 (a mark comprising the musical notes G, E, C
played on chimes, owned by NBC Universal Media LLC); Registration No. 3411881 (a
mark consisting of the spoken word “D’OH,” owned by Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corporation).
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registered with the U.S. Trademark Office34 or protected at common
law.35 Those same images or sounds, or a combination of them, may
also qualify for copyright protection36 and may be registered with
the Copyright Office.37 Innovative aspects of a performance may be
protected by patent, either by utility patent if the innovation is
useful38 or by design patent if the innovation is ornamental.39 While
there is a tension between concepts of fame and trade secrecy, fame
may arise from use of a trade secret in certain situations. One
example would be the “secret” recipe for Kentucky Fried Chicken:
the product is sold and has become famous, but the process of
making it is kept secret. Another example would be a magician’s
fame, which arises from skill in performing a trick, while the method
of performing the trick remains a trade secret. Finally, the combination of these factors may create uniqueness sufficient to qualify for
protection of a right of publicity under some states’ laws.40
III. THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMPONENTS OF FAME
A. Trademarks
Recognizability is the central aspect of fame. In intellectual
property terms, this fits most directly within the scope of trademark
rights.41 Under the federal trademark statute,42 a registrable

34

15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) (2018).
While trademark rights can also exist at common law, the underlying definitions and
principles are the same as those set out in the federal statute and therefore state common
law rights are not treated separately here.
36
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).
37
Id. § 408.
38
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2017). See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,255,452 (filed Oct. 26, 1993)
(example of a patent that protects an innovative aspect of a performance, issued to Michael
Jackson and co-inventors for a shoe that enabled him to perform the seemingly gravitydefying move in Smooth Crimina0.l
39
35 U.S.C. § 171 (2017).
40
See Section III( E), infra.
41
Some states also recognize a “right of publicity.” See infra notes 121–27 and
accompanying text.
42
15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (2018). Trademark rights can also exist at common law. The
underlying definitions and principles are the same as those set out in the federal statute and
therefore state common law rights are not treated separately here.
35
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trademark is a symbol43 “by which the goods of the applicant may
be distinguished from the goods of others.”44 Thus, fame may
be viewed as essentially a trademark, if the famous person is viewed
as the “goods.”
1. The Rights of a Trademark Owner
Properly used, trademarks can be a long-term building block of
fame. The owner of a trademark has the right to prevent use of a
competing mark in connection with the sale of similar goods or
services if the competing mark is likely to cause consumer confusion
as to the source of the goods or services.45 This can be used to
protect—or enhance—fame by preventing others from using
elements which make the owner famous. In its most basic operation,
a trademark can be used to stop others from entering the same field
using the same name.46 More creative uses of trademark rights
include protecting famous characteristics—for example, a sound
associated with the product.47
A trademark has no fixed term. Legal recognition of a trademark
owner’s rights over a mark comes into effect as soon as the mark is
capable of identifying the source of goods or services associated
with the mark,48 and continues to exist for as long as the mark is
43

“The term ‘trademark’ includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof—(1) used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention
to use in commerce and applies to register on the principal register established by this
chapter, to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source
is unknown.” Id. at § 1127.
44
Id. § 1052.
45
15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2018); see, e.g., Polaroid v. Polarad Elec. Corp., 287 F.2d
492 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961).
46
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2018).
47
See, e.g., Registration No. 2821863 (a mark consisting of the spoken words YOU’VE
GOT MAIL, initially registered by America Online). For more examples of sound marks,
see Trademark “Sound Mark” Examples, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/trademark/
soundmarks/trademark-sound-mark-examples [https://perma.cc/P3C8-WFE7].
48
Protecting Your Trademark: Enhancing Your Rights Through Federal Registration,
USPTO, at 10 https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/BasicFacts.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q364-QCZ2]. There is also a procedure for federally registering an
“intent to use” a trademark before the mark is in actual use. Id. at 21. This procedure,
however, confers no trademark rights—it is merely a tool for determining whether the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office will register the mark once it is in actual use in federally
regulated commerce. Id. at 21, 26.
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capable of doing so.49 Trademark rights are lost if the mark is no
longer used or otherwise no longer uniquely identifies the source.50
This potential to lapse is particularly significant, in that it may
compel owners of trademarks to take steps to assure that they
maintain control over the use of the trademark.51
2. Ownership of Trademarks
There are two major theories of trademark law. One theory
views trademarks as a property right designed to afford protection
to its owner against unfair competition by others.52 The other theory
views trademark as a consumer protection device, designed to assure
consumers that when they choose a particular brand they can be
assured that it comes from the source they expect.53 Since, under
either theory, a symbol must create a distinction between similar
goods originating from different sources and must convey
assurances of expected quality in order to become a trademark, the
owner of the trademark must be the source of the trademarked
product, in the sense of being the entity responsible for the product’s

49

Federal registration rights require periodic affidavits confirming continued use and
renewing registration. 15 U.S.C. § 1058 (2010).
50
A mark may be lost by becoming generic if the owner does not prevent others from
using it. Examples of trademarks that lost protection include aspirin, originally—and in
some foreign companies still—a trademark of Bayer. See Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co.,
272 F. 505, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (“[I]t was too late in the autumn of 1915 to reclaim the
word which had already passed into the public domain.”). Thermos was originally a
trademark of the King-Seeley Thermos Company. See also King-Seeley Thermos v.
Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1963) (“the primary significance to the public
of the word “thermos” is its indication of the nature and class of an article rather than as an
indication of its source . . . .”).
51
Thus, for example, a team owner who would otherwise prefer not to create tension
with a player may be compelled to do so if failure would lead to the loss of trademark
rights.
52
See generally, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Trademark as a Property Right, 107 KY. L.J. 1
(2018); William Landes & Richard Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30
J.L. & ECON. 265 (1987).
53
“Trademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying mark,
‘reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,’ for it
quickly and easily assures a potential customer that  the item with this mark . . . is made
by the same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she liked (or disliked) in
the past. At the same time, the law helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating
competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable
product.” Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prod. Co. Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995).
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quality.54 Indeed, an application for federal registration must include
a verified statement to that effect55: “The application must be filed
in the name of the owner of the mark. The owner of the mark is the
person or entity who controls the nature and quality of the goods or
services identified by the mark.”56
The choice of theory does, however, impact the analysis of
whether trademark components of fame belong to the famous person
or to someone else (e.g. an employer). If viewed as a consumer
protection device, the mark should belong to the person with whom
the public associates it—which is usually the performer.57 However,
if viewed as a property right, the analysis is more complicated and
depends on several additional factors, including who conceived,
financed, and publicized the mark so as to make it famous.58
Regardless of who the owner of the mark is, it is easy to see how
a trademark right is a component of fame. Examples of how
trademarks can help to protect fame include protecting the famous

54

15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) (2018).
Id. § 1051(a)(3)(A).
56
See Protecting Your Trademark, supra note 48.
57
In some cases, the actor and role are so closely associated as to defy separation.
Examples include Jerry Mathers (“The Beaver”), Linda Carter (TV’s “Wonder Woman”),
and Clayton Moore (TV’s “Lone Ranger”). See Jerry Mathers, IMDB,
https://www.imdb.com/name/nm0558487/?ref_=nv_sr_1?ref_=nv_sr_1 [https://perma.cc/
7EVT-NQZJ]; Lynda Carter, IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0074074/?ref_=fn_al_
tt_2 [https://perma.cc/8LQQ-8LAR]; Clayton Moore, IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/
name/nm0138194/?ref_=nv_sr_1?ref_=nv_sr_1
[https://perma.cc/9JWU-CAZD].
Resolution of ownership, if not dictated by contract, is critical in the case of remakes and
sequels. An example resolved by settlement is the dispute between Universal Studios and
Crispin Glover over the right to the role of George McFly in the sequel to Back to the
Future. See Glover v. Universal City Studios, Inc., Docket No. BC012735 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Oct. 15, 1990); see also Steve Palace, ‘Back to the Future 2’ Recreated the Face of Crispin
Glove—So He Sued the Studio, VINTAGE NEWS (Aug. 30, 2019),
https://www.thevintagenews.com/2019/08/30/crispin-glover/
[https://perma.cc/R737VDEV]; Eriq Gardner, “Back to the Future II” From a Legal Perspective: Unintentionally
Visionary, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thresq/back-future-ii-a-legal-833705 [https://perma.cc/J77F-FYBH].
58
See Section V.
55
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person’s name as it relates to their fame59 or as it relates to “spinoff” products.60
B. Copyright
Copyright is a powerful form of legal protection. Although
federal copyright protection is only available if the work is fixed,
the statutory definition of fixed is broad enough to cover most forms
of communication.61 Moreover, while copyrights do not have the
same potential as trademarks to endure indefinitely, they are an exceptionally long-lived intellectual property right. The term of any
particular copyright depends on the identity of the author and
whether or not the work has been published.62 In the case of identified individuals, the term is the life of the author plus seventy

59
For example, Madonna Ciccone owns U.S. Registration No.1473554 covering the use
of “Madonna” relating to entertainment. See Trademark Electronic Search System (TESS),
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://tmsearch.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f
=doc&state=4809:v8ja52.2.1 [https://perma.cc/N4GT-PC9C] (follow the “Basic Word
Mark Search (New User)” link; then type in “1473554” into the “Search Term” field, select
“Serial or Registration Number” in the “Field” drop-down menu, and click on the “Submit
Query” button).
60
For example, Madonna Ciccone owns U.S. Registration No. 1463601 covering the
use of “Madonna” on clothing. See Trademark Electronic Search System (TESS), U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://tmsearch.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f=doc&state=
4809:v8ja52.4.1 [https://perma.cc/N4GT-PC9C]. Another example is Electronic Arts’
“Madden NFL Football” computer game, which generated considerable litigation by real
football players depicted in the game, under various theories. In one of those cases, Brown
v. Elec. Arts, Inc., the court held that the use of Jim Brown’s likeness did not violate his
trademark or unfair competition rights, but noted that a different result might be warranted
in a right of publicity case. 724 F.3d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 2013). Although it was a
copyright case, and complicated by transformative-use and public figure issues, Noriega v.
Activision/Blizzard is another interesting example: Manuel Noriega, former president of
Panama and in federal custody at the time, objected to the use of his likeness in Activision’s
Call of Duty videogame. See Noriega v. Activision/Blizzard Inc., No. BC551747 (Cal. Sup.
Ct. Oct. 16, 2014).
61
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018). “A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression
when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is
sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds,
images, or both, that are being transmitted, is ‘fixed’ for purposes of this title if a fixation
of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.” See 17 U.S.C. § 101
(2018).
62
How Long Does Copyright Protection Last?, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF.,
https://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-duration.html [https://perma.cc/FW49-U9R3].
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years.63 In the case of anonymous authors, the term is the earlier of
95 years from publication or 120 years from creation.64
This potentially lengthy duration makes copyright a particularly
useful component of fame.65 The effective term of a copyright can
be extended if derivative works are created, because derivative
works receive their own copyright.66 Even though the derivative
work’s independent copyright will only cover the new elements67
and so will not directly enlarge or extend the parent work’s
copyright, the derivative work will nevertheless memorialize the
parent, because in reality people do not stop recognizing the
borrowed elements as originating from the parent work simply
because the parent has fallen out of copyright protection.
Often the connection between the work and fame is direct, as,
for example, when fame is the result of the production of a
copyrightable work. Andy Warhol’s personal fame is inextricably
entwined with the notoriety of his paintings, which are
copyrighted;68 Andy Warhol is famous because works such as his
“Marilyn Diptych” or “Campbell’s Soup Cans” are famous, and vice
versa—and copyright helps to prevent the tie between the artist and
the artworks from being severed. Similarly, copyright may protect
the connection between a famous sculptor and the works that made
him famous.69 Even some computer game designers have developed
a sufficiently identifiable style to gain personal fame from their

63

17 U.S.C. § 304 (2018).
Id. The term of copyright has been modified by Congress from time to time, in each
case extending the term. The limits of Congress’ ability to extend the term given the
constitutional limitation of “limited terms” was questioned in Eldred v. Ashcroft, and the
Court appeared to see no limit on the length of term, even permitting the extension of
copyright to works that had already fallen into the public domain. See Eldred v. Ashcroft,
537 U.S. 186 (2003)
65
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2018).
66
See id. § 101.
67
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, Circular No. 14, Copyright in Derivative Works and
Compilations, at 2 (2013), available at https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/43XP-3BAT].
68
See, e.g., Licensing Images, Rights Clearance, and Merchandise, ANDY WARHOL
FOUND.
FOR
VISUAL ARTS,
https://warholfoundation.org/licensing/index.html
[https://perma.cc/J5G9-72QA].
69
See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 312 (2d. Cir. 1992) (sculpture depicting
puppies infringed copyright in photograph on which it was based).
64
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copyrighted works.70 Moreover, the dynamic of mutually
reinforcing fame can operate indirectly and run between separate
works, even if created by different authors. For example, a musical
theme can be protected by copyright,71 yet at the same time might
instantly evoke association with another work that includes a similar
musical theme, such as a particular TV show, movie,72 or series, and
related works (such as sequels, prequels, common works,73 or
spinoffs74).
1. The Rights of a Copyright Owner
Although common law copyrights continue to exist, most commercially valuable copyrights are covered by federal statute.75 The
statute establishes protection for original works of authorship fixed
in a tangible medium.76 The statute also provides for the registration
of copyrights.77 Although registration is not a prerequisite to the
existence of a copyright, it is essential to the enforcement of a
copyright, because only a registered copyright can be the subject of
70

For example, Sid Meiers of “Sid Meiers’ Civilization” fame. Benj Edwards, Game
Design Legends: The Golden Age of Sid Meier, PC MAG. (Mar. 16, 2018, 2:30PM),
https://www.pcmag.com/feature/359828/game-design-legends-the-golden-age-of-sidmeier [https://perma.cc/F7QP-9WLB]. For a list of Mr. Meiers’ awards, see Christopher
McFadden, Sid Meier: The Godfather of Computer Gaming, INTERESTING ENGINEERING
(Feb. 23, 2018), https://interestingengineering.com/sid-meier-the-godfather-of-computergaming [https://perma.cc/K3C8-RUU8].
71
For example, themes from James Bond movies are copyrighted. See, e.g., U.S.
Registration No. PAu000132174 (filed Aug. 24, 1979), https://cocatalog.loc.gov/cgibin/Pwebrecon.cgi?DB=local&PAGE=First [https://perma.cc/7NH8-93CM] (in the
“Search for” field, enter “PAu000132174,” and select “Registration Number” in the
“Search by” drop-down menu) (The theme from “For Your Eyes Only.”).
72
An example would be the use of the same Henry Mancini theme in the original Peter
Sellers Pink Panther movies and in the later Steve Martin Pink Panther movies. See Henry
Mancini, IMDB, https://www.imdb.com/name/nm0000049 [https://perma.cc/K7HC4Y25].
73
Compare, for example, the main themes from the DaVinci Code and Angels and
Demons. See Discography, HANS ZIMMER, http://www.hans-zimmer.com/index.php?
rub=discography&bt=2&numid=1 [https://perma.cc/PL2Y-5U7J]. Both movies are based
on books by Dan Brown. See Novels, DAN BROWN, https://danbrown.com/#books-section
[https://perma.cc/4TLX-L9X8].
74
For example, the Pink Panther and Friends TV show, which used the same Henry
Mancini theme music as the Pink Panther movies. See Henry Mancini, supra note 72.
75
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018).
76
Id.
77
Id. § 408.
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a civil action for infringement in federal court, and statutory copyright cases can only be filed in federal courts.78
The owner of a copyright has the right to prevent others from
performing a list of activities,79 foremost of which are copying the
work or creating a derivative work based on the copyrighted work.80
Note that the list of rights that belong to a copyright owner does not
limit other people’s use of the underlying concepts,81 nor does it
preclude independent development of a similar work.82
2. The Ownership of Copyrights
The federal statute provides that copyrights initially belong to
the work’s “author.”83 However, the term “author” has a meaning
within the statutory scheme that in some circumstances diverges
from the word’s everyday meaning. If a work is a “work made for
hire,”84 the creator’s employer rather than the creator of the work is
78

Id. § 411(a). See also Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, 139 S.
Ct. 881 (2019) (holding that copyright owners must obtain a registration from the United
States Copyright Office prior to filing an infringement action). Timely registration also
gives the owner the right to seek attorney fees “statutory damages,” which are fixed
damages which do not require proof of actual damages. 17 U.S.C. § 412.
79
The copyright owner’s exclusive rights are set forth in title 17, section 106, as limited
by exceptions set forth in sections 107 to 115. Principally, the owner has the exclusive right
of reproduction, i.e., the right to stop others from making copies, derivative works, and
public displays or performances.
80
The concept of copying is relatively straightforward, although complicated by the
introduction of digital copying. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2018). Although defined by title
17, section 101, what constitutes a derivative work is a more subjective determination.
Simple examples include a movie script as a derivative work of a book, a videogame based
on a movie (or vice versa), or a resulting screen display as a derivative work of the
underlying computer code. A more imaginative claim of derivation is Vladimir Putin’s
claim that a Harry Potter character is based on him. See Russian Lawyers Say Harry Potter
Character Dobby Is Based on Putin, GUARDIAN (Jan. 30, 2003, 6:13AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/film/2003/jan/30/harrypotter.news
[https://perma.cc/
M3AP-W42Q]. Derivative works can and often do include works in formats other than the
original, subject only to the statutory constraint that to be considered a derivative work, the
work must incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work “in some concrete or permanent
form.” Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., 964 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1992).
81
See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, Circular No. 31, Ideas, Methods, Systems (Jan. 2012),
available at https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ31.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WYB-4US4].
82
Id.
83
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
84
A work is “made for hire” if it is prepared by an employee within the scope of his or
her employment. It may also be “made for hire” if it is “specially ordered or commissioned
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considered the author.85 If a work is jointly authored,86 then any one
of the authors may use the work but must account to the other
authors for any revenues flowing from that use.87
Copyrights are personal property, and as such can be assigned
or licensed by contract.88 There is great flexibility in assignment and
licensing: the copyright owner can assign some or all of the
categories of rights, can grant licenses that allocate geographic
territories, time limits, or other conditions to the assignment, and can
make the assignment or license exclusive, non-exclusive, or sole.89
C. Patents
Two categories of patents are relevant to this Article’s
examination of fame: utility patents, which protect new and useful
inventions,90 and design patents, which protect new and ornamental

for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an
instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas” if the parties
expressly agree in a writing that the work shall be considered a work made for hire. 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2018).
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 6.12(A)
(Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2019).
88
Copyright assignments (unlike assignments of other intellectual property rights) are,
by statute, terminable at the option of the author under certain circumstances, and this
option to terminate cannot be varied by contract. 17 U.S.C. § 304 (2018). Because an
employer is the initial owner in the case of a work made for hire, but a transferee if
ownership is acquired by assignment, this is an important distinction.
89
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, Circular No. 1, Copyright Basics, at 2 (Rev. 2019),
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ01.pdf [https://perma.cc/AH3T-SNGM]. A nonexclusive license allows the copyright owner to grant other licenses; an exclusive license
does not allow other licenses but allows the copyright owner to continue to use the
copyright; a sole license grants the assignee the sole right to use the copyright (including
the right to exclude even the copyright owner from using the copyright); an assignment
transfers ownership of the copyright. See Christopher M. Newman, An Exclusive License
Is Not an Assignment: Disentangling Divisibility and Transferability of Ownership in
Copyright, 74 LA. L. REV. (2013); see also DRAFTING LICENSE AGREEMENTS § 1.02
(Michael A. Epstein & Frank L. Politano eds., 4th ed. 2012).
90
To be more precise, utility patents may be issued upon review of an application filed
under 35 U.S.C. § 111, showing that the claimed invention is new and useful as required
by 35 U.S.C. § 101, that the claimed invention falls into one of four statutory categories
(machine, manufacture, composition of matter or process) enumerated in 35 U.S.C. § 101,
that the claimed invention is novel as defined by 35 U.S.C. § 102, that the claimed invention
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designs for manufactured articles.91 Utility patents rarely play a significant role in establishing fame,92 but design patents can function
much like trademarks in connecting public perceptions with a
particular individual or company.93
1. The Rights of a Patent Owner
Utility patents last for twenty years from the date an application
is filed,94 whereas design patents last for fifteen years.95 Patent
rights, in each case, begin when the patent application is approved
and issued.96 During its term, a patent prevents all others from
making, using, selling, or importing items which are covered by the
patent claims.97
2. Ownership of Patents
The default rule for patent ownership is that it belongs to the
inventor.98 In the case of joint invention, each joint inventor has an
undivided interest in the entire patent and, as such, can license its
use and keep the proceeds without the permission of the other joint

is non-obvious as defined by 35 U.S.C. § 103 and that the claimed invention is enabled as
required by 35 U.S.C. § 112.
91
Compare 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2017) (requiring that the claimed invention be useful), with
35 U.S.C. § 171 (2017) (requiring that the claimed invention be ornamental).
92
But see U.S. Patent No. 5,255,452, supra note 38. That patent discloses the “trick”
behind the seemingly gravity-defying move in Michael Jackson’s Smooth Criminal video:
it was done with “[a] system for allowing a shoe wearer to lean forwardly beyond his center
of gravity by virtue of wearing a specially designed pair of shoes which will engage with
a hitch member movably projectable through a stage surface. The shoes have a specially
designed heel slot which can be detachably engaged with the hitch member by simply
sliding the shoe wearer’s foot forward, thereby engaging with the hitch member.” Id.
93
See generally, e.g., Apple v. Samsung, 727 F.3d 1373 (2013) (illustrating the use of
design patents as part of a strategy to prevent competitors’ imitation of the appearance of
the iPhone).
94
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2017).
95
Id. § 173.
96
Id. § 154.
97
Id. § 271.
98
Patents are intangible personal property, so ownership may be assigned in whole or
in part. Id. § 261. It is common for employers to require contractual assignment of any
patentable inventions made by employees.
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inventor.99 This is so even if a co-inventor only contributed to the
invention of some of the claims of the patent.100
Patents are not commonly used to protect fame because their
costs are high and their duration is brief compared with other types
of IP protection. Nevertheless, patents can be a component of fame
in certain circumstances. Design patents in particular may be an
especially important element in a product’s popular recognition. For
example, Apple protected the design of its iPhone and successfully
sued Samsung to prevent it from using Apple’s patented design
elements to build a competing phone.101 Design patents can also be
used as part of a trademark development strategy, by securing patent
protection during the period that it takes to develop the public
recognition required for trademark protection to be available.102
Likewise, utility patents may be useful where fame is based on the
exclusive possession of a machine, manufacture, composition of
matter, or process.103
D. Trade Secrets
Superficially, trade secret rights might seem inconsistent with
the concept of fame. It is, however, quite possible that an individual
might become famous by virtue of possession of a—or use of
someone else’s—trade secret. There are situations where it is possible to maintain in secrecy the “how” while capitalizing on the
99
Id. §§ 116, 262(e)(4); Ethicon v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1468 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (dismissing an infringement suit where one of two co-inventors had granted a license
to the defendant).
100
See Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1460.
101
Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., Ltd., 727 F.3d 1352, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
102
A design patent can be prepared and obtained comparatively quickly. All that is
required is a drawing of the design and a formulaic claim to “[T]he ornamental design . . .
as shown.” 37 C.F.R. § 1.153 (2019). When issued, the design patent will, for a period of
15 years, prevent competitors from using the design on competing goods. 35 U.S.C. § 173
(2017). Since no competitor could make a competing use of the design, the patent owner’s
use will be “exclusive” for the 5 years ordinarily required to establish distinctiveness, and
therefore the right to a federal trademark, under Section 2(f) of the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052(f) (2006) (“The Director may accept as prima facie evidence that the mark has
become distinctive, as used on or in connection with the applicant’s goods in commerce,
proof of substantially exclusive and continuous use thereof as a mark by the applicant in
commerce for the five years before the date on which the claim of distinctiveness is
made.”).
103
See supra note 90.
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“what.” An obvious example would be that of a magician, whose
fame might be based on the ability to perform tricks which the
audience can observe but cannot figure out how to do. A less
obvious example would be confidential information that allows an
individual to achieve success, such as a sports team’s playbook, a
talent agent’s contact list, or a law firm’s form file.
1. The Rights of a Trade Secret Owner
Trade secrets are largely common-law rights under state law.104
While state laws differ in the details of the definition of trade
secrecy, the general pattern is that information qualifies as a trade
secret if it is not generally known and the owner takes reasonable
steps to keep the information confidential.105 The owner of a trade
secret has the right to prevent misappropriation,106 which includes
improper acquisition, disclosure, or use of the trade secret.107
Misappropriation does not include independent creation of the same
information,108 nor does it include acquisition of the information by
“proper” means.109 In most jurisdictions, reverse engineering of a
publicly available embodiment of the trade secret is proper.110 Thus,
unlike patent rights,111 trade secret rights do not protect against
independent development of the same technology.
A trade secret has no fixed term—it begins when information
meets the definition, and continues to exist for as long as the
information continues to do so.112 In theory, a trade secret could be
perpetual. However, the legally recognized secrecy is destroyed if
the owner ceases to protect the confidentiality of the information113

104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113

See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974).
Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) 14 U.L.A. 529–659 (Supp. 2010) (amended 1985).
Id. § 2(a).
Id. § 1(2).
Id. § 2(a).
Id.
Id. § 1(4) cmt.
Id. § 2(a).
Id. § 1(4).
Id.
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or if, notwithstanding the owner’s efforts, the information becomes
generally known.114
2. Ownership of Trade Secrets
Information becomes a trade secret as soon as it meets the
elements of the term’s definition in the relevant state’s law.115 There
is no registration system for trade secrets, nor is there any examination to determine if the claimed secret meets the definition.116 There
is therefore no system in place for establishing ownership or
resolving competing claims, nor is there a need for one: multiple
people can “own” the same trade secret because ownership only
confers the right to prevent misappropriation.
E. State Rights: The Right of Privacy and the Right of Publicity
The right of publicity and right of privacy both stem from
common law protections over the interests of the individual
“self.”117 Despite their similar foundation, however, privacy rights
and publicity rights differ in their underlying public policy goals and
scope of protection. The common-law right of privacy is said to
protect against intrusion upon the plaintiff’s private affairs, disclosure of embarrassing private facts, false light, and appropriation of
the plaintiff’s name or likeness at the defendant’s advantage.118 To

114

For example, if a trade secret owner’s competitor independently discovers the same
information and chooses to disclose it, the trade secret owner loses protection because the
information has become “generally known.” Id. § 1(4).
115
Id. § 1(4).
116
“Contrary to patents, trade secrets are protected without registration, that is, trade
secrets are protected without any procedural formalities.” How Are Trade Secrets
Protected??, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., https://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/
trade_secrets/protection.htm [https://perma.cc/5PSJ-VKFG].
117
As common law rights, specific definitions, interpretations, and rights vary from state
to state. For a list of state right of publicity statutes, see Statutes & Interactive Map, RIGHT
PUBLICITY, http://www.rightofpublicity.com/statutes [https://perma.cc/BF6A-49BP],
which lists twenty-one states with such statutes. See WESTON ANSON, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY:
ANALYSIS, VALUATION, AND THE LAW 66–78 (2015) (discussing states that recognize a
common-law right of publicity).
118
See Battaglieri v. Mackinac Ctr. For Pub. Policy, 680 N.W.2d 915, 919 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2004).
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the extent this may be thought of as a property right,119 that right is
secondary to protection of the owner’s right to be left alone.120
On the other hand, instead of protecting the individual’s right to
be left alone,121 the right of publicity “protects an individual’s pecuniary interest in the commercial exploitation of his or her identity”122
and is therefore a more traditional property right.123 The concept of
a “right of publicity” was recognized as early as 1905,124 in a case
in which the use of plaintiff’s image as the “before” picture in an
advertisement was held to violate the plaintiff’s right to her own
image. That case extended the then-recently-developed theory of a
right of privacy125 to conclude, “I think that the plaintiff has the same
property in the right to be protected against the use of her face for
defendants’ commercial purposes as she would have if they were
publishing her literary compositions . . . if her face . . . has a value,
the value is hers exclusively . . . .“126

119

See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 69 (Ga. 1905). The right of
privacy cannot be transferred. However, it is possible to surrender the right in exchange for
consideration, so it can be thought of as a property right.
120
See Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imps. and Exps., 270 F.3d 298 (6th Cir. 2001).
121
States that recognize the right of privacy generally extend to the owner protection
against: (1) intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs;
(2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (3) publicity which
places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; or (4) appropriation, for the defendant’s
advantage, of the plaintiff’s name or likeness. See Battaglieri, 680 N.W.2d at 919.
122
Ruffin-Steinback v. dePasse, 82 F. Supp. 2d 723, 729 (E.D. Mich. 2000). States that
recognize the right of publicity generally extend to the owner protection against those who
“[appropriate] the commercial value of a person’s identity by using without consent the
person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade . . . .”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
123
The right of publicity is an intellectual property right that arises when “the reaction of
the public to name and likeness, which may be fortuitous or which may be managed or
planned, endows the name and likeness of the person involved with commercially
exploitable opportunities.” Id. at 541–42.
124
See Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 68–69.
125
Several Restatements recognize appropriation of name or likeness as a type of
invasion of privacy. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (AM. LAW
INST. 2006); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmts. a & b, illus. 1 & 2 (AM. LAW
INST. 1977).
126
See Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 79 (quoting Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E.
442 (N.Y. 1902) (Gray, J., dissenting)).
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The right of publicity is now protected by statute in at least
twenty-one states127 and has been recognized by the Supreme
Court128 and the Restatement of Unfair Competition.129 As with all
intellectual property rights, there is a conflict between granting
control through the right of publicity, and the right to free speech
under the First Amendment.130
The right of publicity may include features broader than mere
appearance.131 The Indiana statute provides a good example of the
multiplicity of components that make up the right: a personality’s
name, voice,132 signature, photograph, image,133 likeness, distinctive appearance, gestures or mannerisms.134 However, even that
broad set of attributes is not exclusive. For instance, in the “human
cannonball” case, the Supreme Court recognized entertainer Hugo
Zacchini’s right to control the “exploitation of his personality and
the exercise of his talents,” which in this case encompassed
Zacchini shooting from a cannon into a net “some 200 feet away.”135
Additionally, courts have recognized the right in a catchphrase

127

Those states are Alabama, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. See Statutes &
Interactive Map, supra note 117.
128
See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 562, 564 (1977) (holding
that the First Amendment did not allow broadcasters to show the plaintiff’s entire “human
cannonball” performance without permission, as televising the event diminished its value
by reducing the number of people willing to pay to see it).
129
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
130
See, e.g., Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 2013) (“In this case,
we must balance the right of publicity of a former college football player against the
asserted First Amendment right of a video game developer to use his likeness in its
expressive works.”).
131
See generally Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
132
IND. CODE ANN. § 32–36–1–7 (2017). See also Midler v. Ford, 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th
Cir. 1989); Waits v. Frito-Lay, 978 F.2d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 1992).
133
See generally White v. Samsung Elec., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
134
IND. CODE ANN. § 32–36–1–7.
135
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 563 (1977). The Court held
that, while the Ohio Supreme Court had a right to privilege the press in its broadcast of
“matters of public interest,” such as the footage of the “human cannonball,” such right is
not guaranteed by the First or Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 578–79.
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widely associated with an individual136 and even in a car widely
associated with its driver.137
The right of privacy and the right of publicity confer different
terms of protection. The right of publicity fundamentally consists of
a person’s legal right to exclude others from commercial
exploitation of his or her identity,138 and thus it preserves the
fundamental role that the right to exclude plays in traditional
property rights.139 The right of publicity further reflects traditional
property rights in that it is assignable and survives the individual
who created it.140 On the other hand, the right of privacy is typically
limited to the lifespan of the individual because it is a
“dignitary” right.141
IV. RECONCILING OWNERSHIP: THE BLOCKING NATURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
It should be apparent that, because the definition of each type of
intellectual property is different, they generally are not mutually
exclusive rights. Nothing in the definitions of copyright, trademark,
patent, trade secret, or the right of publicity precludes someone from
simultaneously using a combination of these IP rights to protect
components of the overall thing that is fame.142 For example, the
manufacturer of a motorcycle can have a utility patent on components of the motorcycle, a design patent on the appearance of the
motorcycle, copyrights on designs for the motorcycle, a trademark

136

See, e.g., Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831, 836 (6th Cir. 1983)
(recognizing a right in Johnny Carson’s catchphrase “Here’s Johnny”).
137
See, e.g., Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir.
1974) (professional race car driver Lothar Motschenbacher was known for individualizing
his race cars).
138
See Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazetti Imps. & Exps., 270 F.3d 298, 325 (2001).
139
On the traditional right to exclude, see, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the
Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998).
140
See Palazetti 270 F.3d at 325.
141
Id.; see also Maritote v. Desilu Prod., Inc., 345 F.2d 418, 420 (1965) (“It is anomalous
to speak of the privacy of a deceased person.”).
142
There is one notable exception: because patents are published and must be enabling
under 35 U.S.C. § 112, while trade secrets require that the information not be public,
these rights impose inconsistent requirements and therefore cannot be maintained
simultaneously.
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on the sound of the motorcycle engine, and trade secrets covering
its upcoming advertising campaign. Furthermore, because the
definitions and default ownership rights differ, different people may
own different components of the same collective fame. Ultimately,
the central principle of intellectual property is that it consists in
negative rights—IP rights exist to stop others from doing things;
they do not confer any affirmative right on the owner.
Given the variety of rights potentially involved in fame and the
negative nature of these rights, in many instances a group of people
may need to act in concert in order to assemble all of the rights
necessary to comprise fame. Therefore, before we can determine
ownership of the overall thing that is fame, it is necessary to
determine precisely which rights are involved, which aspects of
fame they cover, and who possesses each of the rights.
V. THE AGENCY COMPLICATION
There is one additional legal concept beyond intellectual
property itself that must be considered: agency. Any activity
involving one person acting on behalf of others raises questions of
agency law, and fame is often created in conjunction with, or on
behalf of, another person or organization. Indeed, the law of agency
bears on the interrelated questions of ownership of fame and the
right to profit from that fame.
A. The Nature of Agency
Agency arises whenever two parties manifest their consent143
that one party (the “agent”) will act on behalf of, and subject to the
143

Section 1.01 of the Third Restatement of Agency formally defines agency as “the
fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to
another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to
the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). Such an agreement is
measured using standard contract rules. There is no requirement that the agreement be in
writing (unless the acts to be carried out by the agent are within the Statute of Frauds and
therefore are required to be in writing under that rule). There is no requirement that the
parties use the words “agent,” “agency,” “principal,” or other “magic” words. The
relationship is purely definitional, and if the definition is met an agency is created. See,
e.g., Jenson Farms v. Cargill, 309 N.W.2d 285, 290 (Minn. 1981); see also Gorton v. Doty,
69 P.2d 136, 143 (Idaho 1937).
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control of, the other party (the “principal”).144 If those requirements
are met, an agency is created. The relationship arises as a matter of
common law, and an agency may even be created unintentionally.145
Therefore, agency is not limited to situations in which the main
reason for creating the relationship is to delegate authority from the
principal to the agent. It can arise even in traditional employment
relationships, where the employer remains in nominal control.146
Agencies are ubiquitous, if often unrecognized or called by other
names. For example, any business entity with more than one person
inherently involves agency: in a general partnership, every partner
is an agent of the partnership147; a corporation must have a resident
agent,148 and it may also have many other agents whose titles do not
indicate agency.149 In the “fame” context, examples of agency
relationships would include those between sports figures and the
teams for which they play,150 between media stars and media
organizations,151 and even between political figures and party
organizations or constituencies. Therefore, the question of the extent
to which the famous agent may use that fame for purposes other than
furthering the principal’s goals is one of broad concern and
applicability. The answer to that question turns on the nature and
definition of fame, the property elements that make up “fame”
(however defined), and the ownership of those property elements.
Particularly relevant to the question of ownership are those
rights and duties, both between the parties and with respect to third

144

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
There must be an intent that one party will act on behalf of and subject to the control
of the other party, but the parties need not intend to—or even realize—that by doing so
they are creating an agency relationship. See, e.g., Cargill, 309 N.W.2d at 290; Doty, 69
P.2d at 143.
146
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
147
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS (“MCAA”) § 9A–301 (1998); Summers
v. Dooley, 481 P.2d 318, 320 (Idaho 1971).
148
See, e.g., MCAA § 2–108.
149
For example, a corporation’s board of directors are agents under MCAA section 2–
401, as are its officers under MCAA section 2–414.
150
While playing, even a famous ballplayer acts on behalf of and subject to the direction
of (and is funded and supported by) a team. The ballplayer is thus an agent.
151
While arguably of less importance than before the Internet allowed cheap, easy selfpromotion, publishers and recording and movie studios provide support for authors,
musicians, and actors that make significant contributions to establishing their fame.
145
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parties, that arise by operation of law upon the creation of an agency
relationship. Most of the elements of fame are transferrable
intangible property rights152 and therefore can be controlled by
contract. However, contracts do not always address all ownership
issues, particularly in fields where the scope of what may be owned
is evolving g. In situations that are not governed by contract, each
of the intellectual property rights has its own set of rules for the
creation of the right, the ownership of the right, the duration of the
right, and the power which ownership confers on the owner, as well
as the degree to which contracts can overrule the defaults. Some of
the statutes make explicit provision for determining ownership when
one party creates the right but another party pays for it or otherwise
controls its creation.153 Moreover, the principles of common law
agency may impact ownership of those rights that are not controlled
by statute.154
B. The Power of the Agent
Merely by virtue of the creation of the agency relationship, the
agent is given authority to bind the principal in contract within the
scope of the agency, and to impose tort liability on the principal for
acts done by the agent within the scope of the agency.155 The
authority may be “actual authority,” which consists in the power that

152

One exception arises under U.S. copyright law. See supra Section III(B)(2).
Compare the ownership rights conferred by the copyright statute’s work-made-forhire-provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 101 (employer is the “author” and therefore owns the
copyright, see, e.g., Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737
(1989) (noting the employer is the “author” and therefore owns the copyright), with the
ownership rights conferred by the patent statute. See, e.g., Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S.
226, 233 (1886) (noting the employee owns the patent, subject at most to an implied license
to the employer).
154
See, e.g., supra note 145 and accompanying text.
155
Many cases turn on determination of the “scope of the agency.” See, e.g., Birkner v.
Salt Lake, 771 P.2d 1053, 1057 (Utah 1989). Factors normally considered include the
objective of the agency, whether the agent’s actions were motivated by the interests of the
principal or personal interests, and whether the agent’s actions were within the control of
the principal. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (AM. LAW. INST. 2006). The cases
are not reliably consistent. Compare, e.g., Robarge v. Bechtel, 640 P.2d 211, 213 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1982) (holding that traveling to and from a job was not within the scope), with
Luth v. Rogers, 507 P.2d 761, 764–66 (Alaska 1973) (holding that a jury determination
that such travel was within the scope would not be disturbed).
153
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the principal intended to confer on the agent.156 Alternatively, the
agent may have “apparent authority,” which encompasses power
that the principal may not have intended to confer on the agent, but
which nevertheless is traceable to manifestations made by the
principal to a third party and arises if that third party reasonably
believes the agent to have been given that power. As long as the
third party’s perception of authority is reasonable and traceable back
to the principal’s manifestations, apparent authority may even arise
in situations where the principal has explicitly forbidden what the
agent did.157
C. Fiduciary Duties of the Agent
Agents with actual or apparent authority have the power to do
extreme damage to principals, because they have the power to bind
the principals to legal obligations to third parties.158 Accordingly, a
set of rules govern the behavior of agents—namely, fiduciary
duties.159 Because agents have broad and only partially limited
156
Actual authority is sometimes broken down into “explicit” authority, that authority
which the principal and agent explicitly agreed to, and “implied” or “inherent” authority,
authority which, while not explicitly discussed, was necessary in order to exercise the
explicit authority. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 2.01–03 (AM. LAW. INST. 2006).
An example of explicit authority would be “here are my car keys and credit card. You are
authorized to drive my car to the gas station, fill the tank with gas, and charge it to my
credit card.” If, instead, the instructions had been “here is my credit card—fill my car with
gas,” it would be implicit that the agent could use the keys and drive the car to the gas
station.
157
Jenson Farms v. Cargill, 309 N.W.2d 285, 290 (Minn. 1981); Gorton v. Doty, 69 P.2d
136, 143 (Idaho 1937). For example, if the principal gave the agent a credit card and said
“you may use it to buy pencils but not pens” and the agent bought pens, the principal would
be obligated to pay the credit card bill because the merchant would have no reason to know
of (or suspect) the limitation on the use of the credit card. Note that actual authority is
determined from the viewpoint of the principal and the agent, while apparent authority is
measured from the viewpoint (and knowledge) of an outsider. The outsider’s belief that
agency exists must be reasonable and must be based on actions of the principal. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 2.01–03. This second requirement should be
obvious—otherwise a principal could be liable merely if a completely unrelated third party
falsely claimed to be an agent.
158
See supra text accompanying note 148. A separate issue is the liability of the agent to
the principal for violation of instructions. If the agent has the resources to compensate the
principal, the problem is minimized. However, since the principal is directly liable to the
third party, any loss would be borne by the principal.
159
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01; see also supra text accompanying note
143.
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power to deal with their principals’ resources, they are required to
act in their principals’ best interests.160 This requirement is
expressed in two basic rules of agency: agents owe their principals
duties of loyalty and care.161
The duty of loyalty requires that the agent’s primary concern be
the best interests of the principal, not those of the agent.162 It is easy
to see how an agent, having the power to exercise control over assets
belonging to the principal by virtue of the agency relationship, might
be tempted to use those assets in a way that benefits the agent.163
Conceptually, an agent might be presented with a profitable opportunity and need to decide whether to take the opportunity on the
principal’s behalf or take it personally; an agent might be presented
with a choice between options, one of which benefits the principal
but harms the agent and one of which does not benefit the principal
as much but does less harm to the agent; or an agent might be
presented with an opportunity which costs the principal nothing but
requires the agent to use the principal’s resources in order to benefit
personally.164 Each of these poses a conflict of interest.
It is a fundamental rule of agency law that an agent must avoid
conflicts of interest, or must disclose them to the principal and act

160

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01.
For example, a Maryland corporate director (an agent of the corporation) is by statute
required to act “(1) In good faith; (2) In a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best
interests of the corporation; and (3) With the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like
position would use under similar circumstances.” MCAA § 2–405(1) I (2016). The
requirement to act in good faith is not the result of agency law, but is a general requirement
applicable to all contractual relationships. Partnership law makes this distinction clear:
MCAA section 9A-404(a) states that “[t]he only fiduciary duties a partner owes to the
partnership and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care,” but section
9A-404(d) states “[a] partner shall discharge the duties to the partnership and the other
partners . . . and exercise any rights consistently with the obligation of good faith and fair
dealing,” making clear that although there are only two fiduciary duties, there is a third
(non-fiduciary) duty as well. MCAA § 9A-404(a), (d).
162
See MCAA § 9A-404(b).
163
See, e.g., Reading v. Regem [1948], 2 KB 268, 268 (Eng.); Meinhard v. Salmon, 164
N.E. 545, 547 (N.Y. 1928).
164
For example, the agent may learn of an opportunity—or be offered an opportunity—
because of the agent’s association with the principal or because of access to the principal’s
assets. See, e.g., In re eBay, Inc. Shareholders Litig., No. C.A. 19988-NC, 2004 WL
253521, at *5 (Del. Ch. 2004) (unpublished opinion); see also Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 547;
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.03, 8.04 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
161
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only after gaining the principal’s approval to do so.165 This is so even
if the agent’s gain does not correspond to a loss by the principal,166
and even if the agent’s actions result in a profit for the principal.167
Moreover, the duty of loyalty can be violated even if the agent did
not receive a monetary benefit—even, for example, using an
intangible asset, such as access to the principal’s facilities in order
to promote a cause the agent believes worthy, but is not in the
best interests of the principal, would suffice to breach this
fiduciary duty.168
The duty of care generally169 requires that, in dealing on behalf
of a principal, an agent must exercise the skill and judgment that a
reasonable person would exercise if dealing with his own assets in

165

See, e.g., MCAA § 2–419(b) (2016) (corporate directors); MCAA § 9A-103(b)(3)
(partnerships).
166
See Reading v. Regem [1948], 2 KB 268, 268 (Eng.); County of Essex v. First Union
Nat’l Bank, 891 A.2d 600, 607 (N.J. 2006) (upholding disgorgement of fees earned under
a contract secured by bribery regardless of lack of actual damages, because “[i]t is the evil
of the wrongdoer retaining any of the fruits of its wrongful conduct that grounds the
claim”).
167
See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A2d 858, 864 (Del. 1985) (noting that the principal
might have profited even more).
168
See, e.g., Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 516 (4th Cir.
1999) (describing undercover reporters who obtained employment at Food Lion in order
to videotape food handling practices for a story violated their duty of loyalty to their
employer). “Because Dale and Barnett did not compete with Food Lion, misappropriate
any of its profits or opportunities, or breach its confidences, ABC argues that the reporters
did not engage in any disloyal conduct that is tortious under existing law. Indeed, the
district court acknowledged that it was the first court to hold that the conduct in question
‘would be recognized by the Supreme Courts of North Carolina and South Carolina’ as
tortiously violating the duty of loyalty . . . ABC’s interest was to expose Food Lion to the
public as a food chain that engaged in unsanitary and deceptive practices. Dale and Barnett
served ABC’s interest, at the expense of Food Lion, by engaging in the taping for ABC
while they were on Food Lion’s payroll. In doing this, Dale and Barnett did not serve Food
Lion faithfully, and their interest (which was the same as ABC’s) was diametrically
opposed to Food Lion’s. In these circumstances, we believe that the highest courts of North
and South Carolina would hold that the reporters—in promoting the interests of one master,
ABC, to the detriment of a second, Food Lion—committed the tort of disloyalty against
Food Lion.” Id.
169
Learned Hand noted this limitation in The T.J. Hooper, observing “in most cases
reasonable prudence is common prudence; but strictly it is never its measure: a whole
calling may have been laggard in the adoption of new and available devices.” 60 F.2d 727,
740 (2d Cir. 1932).
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like circumstances.170 In some contexts, this standard has been
augmented by statute, the most pervasive being the federal
Sarbanes-Oxley Act relating to disclosures by publicly held
corporations, and the so-called “Caremark duties” also relating to
corporate directors,171 but none of these contexts apply to the
analysis that follows.
D. The Principal’s Rights
The principal/agent relationship is a contractual relationship.
Therefore, if an agent violates (or threatens to violate) any of the
above duties, the principal has standard contract remedies: damages
and, if appropriate, injunctive relief. Because the relationship is
a fiduciary relationship with significant potential for abuse, principals have the additional remedy of disgorgement.172 This remedy is
intended to remove temptation by eliminating the potential for
benefitting from disloyalty.173
One of the best examples of the application of the absolute rule
of disgorgement is an English case holding that the use of a uniform
by an employee (in this case, a soldier) indicating affiliation with a
principal (in this case, the British government) required the
employee to turn over to the principal the profits earned using the
uniform.174 What is notable about the case is that Reading, as agent,
170

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (providing that an agent must act with the
care, competence and diligence normally exercised by agents in similar circumstances);
Hun v. Carey, 82 N.Y. 65, 73 (1880); Brane v. Roth, 590 N.E.2d 587, 592 (Ind. 1993)
(describing duty of corporate directors).
171
See In re Caremark, 698 A.2d 959, 967–68 (Del. 1996).
172
See Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 271–73 (1951); see also Graham Douthwaite,
Profits and Their Recovery, 15 VILL. L. REV. 346, 370 (1970); Gelfand v. Horizon, 675
F.2d 1108, 1111–12 (10th Cir. 1982) (recognizing the availability of the remedy, but
holding that it is within the trial court’s equitable discretion whether or not to impose it).
173
Disgorgement is appropriate when “any lesser liability would provide an inadequate
incentive to [engage in] lawful behavior.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND
UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 3 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2010); see also Tarnowski v. Resop, 51
N.W.2d 801, 803 (Minn. 1952) (allowing recovery of agent’s secret profits even though
the offending contract had been rescinded).
174
During World War II, Sergeant Reading was serving in the Royal Army Medical
Corps, stationed in Cairo. Reading v. Regem [1948] 2 KB 268 (Eng.). He was approached
by a stranger who asked if he would help transport liquor from Alexandria to Cairo, for
which he would be paid “a few” Egyptian pounds. Id. He agreed and was instructed to
board a lorry, wearing his uniform, at an appointed time and take it to the delivery point.
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had not taken advantage of an opportunity that was available to his
principal—had Reading offered the opportunity to the government,
the government would not have gone into the smuggling business.
Therefore, the principal did not lose profits. This is not, therefore, a
typical case of contract damages. Rather, it establishes the rule that,
in order to discourage disloyalty by eliminating the incentive for
an agent to take advantage of the position of trust, any use of a principal’s resources requires the agent to disgorge any resulting profits.
The rule is generally applicable in the United States as well,175
as exemplified by General Auto v. Singer.176 Singer was general
manager of General Auto, responsible for obtaining machine-shop
work for the company.177 Singer apparently had an excellent
personal reputation, which attracted so much business that at some
point Singer began turning business away. Rather than consult with
the owner, Singer brokered the business to other companies,
charging the customer and having the work done by other machine
shops for a lower price and keeping the difference. The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin held this was “inconsistent with the obligations
of a faithful agent or employee” and that Singer owed an accounting
for his “secret profit.”178
Id. Upon completing the first delivery he received 2,000 pounds. Id. He then carried out
several similar deliveries, earning roughly 20,000 Egyptian pounds. Id. The relationship
eventually came to the attention of British authorities. Id. It is easy to conclude that Sgt.
Reading was in trouble. Id. The specific type of trouble is interesting: the Crown seized the
proceeds and claimed that the government was entitled to the money because the funds
were “received and held . . . in trust for His Majesty.” Id. The theory appeared to be that
Reading was an agent for the government and used his principal’s resources (the uniform)
in order to profit. Id. Not explicit in the case, but obvious, is that Reading had no special
skill that justified the payments he received—it was his presence, in uniform, that helped
move contraband liquor through wartime checkpoints. Id. Notwithstanding his argument
that he was required by army regulations to wear his uniform even when off-duty, the court
held the government entitled to the proceeds. Id.
175
3 AM. JUR. 2d Agency § 268.
176
See generally General Auto. Mfg. v. Singer, 120 N.W.2d 659 (Wis. 1963).
177
Id. at 660.
178
As is typical in this type of case, the agent argued that no harm was done: Singer
argued that when the company had the shop capacity to fill an order he would award them
the job, but it was his duty as general manager to refuse orders which in his opinion the
company could not or should not fill and in that case he was free to treat the order as his
own property. Id. at 662. The court rejected this theory, holding that “Singer had the duty
to exercise good faith by disclosing to Automotive all the facts regarding this matter,”
leaving to the company the choice to accept, refuse or to sub-contract them. Id. at 663. As
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Gelfand v. Horizon Corp. represents a further extension of an
agent’s duty to act solely for the benefit of the principal and to
disgorge any profits made in violation of that duty, even when the
principal could not establish any loss as a result of the agent’s
violation of the duty of loyalty.179 In that case, Mr. Gelfand was a
real estate salesman for Horizon. In one of the transactions at issue
in the case, Horizon owned a piece of property known as Barranca
Estates. Horizon had been trying to sell it for one or two years before
Gelfand arrived and had set a sales price of $165,000. Gelfand’s
wife and son were owners of one-third of a company formed solely
for the purpose of obtaining an option on the property—a fact not
disclosed to Horizon. Their company paid $2,500 for the option,
then sold the option to a third party for $60,000—the Gelfands
received $20,000 as their share of the profits. The third party then
exercised the option, paying Horizon the full $165,000 asking price.
The court noted the general rule:
The law regarding fiduciary relationships in New
Mexico is generally similar to the laws throughout
the United States. An agent occupies a relationship
in which trust and confidence is the standard. When
the agent places his own interests above those of the
principal there is a breach of fiduciary duty to the
principal.180
The trial court had, unsurprisingly, denied Gelfand a
commission on the transaction. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed that ruling, but also went further and held that Horizon was
also entitled to recover the $20,000 profit made by Gelfand’s family.
The Tenth Circuit further noted that the trial court had the discretion
to award the entire $60,000 profit even though the Gelfand family
only received $20,000.181 As to this point, the court explained:

the court noted, Singer’s actions deprived the company of the right to decide whether to
expand, buy more equipment, or make its own arrangements to subcontract the work. Id.
179
See Gelfand v. Horizon Corp., 675 F.2d 1108, 1111–12 (10th Cir. 1982).
180
Id. at 1110.
181
The court held that this award was discretionary and that the trial court’s decision as
to whether or not to award the additional $40,000 earned by others as a result of the
violation of fiduciary duty was within its general power to do equity. Id. at 1114.
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It would appear from the cases that a fiduciary who
has, by violating his obligation of loyalty, made it
possible for others to make profits, can himself be
held accountable for that profit regardless of whether
he has realized it . . . . The theory is that the trustee
is not to be free to authorize others to do what he is
forbidden . . . . The cases hold that the purpose for
restoring profits is to discourage potential conflicts
of interest and duty; the complaining principal or
employer need not prove that any loss was caused by
fiduciary’s misconduct . . . . The restitution of profits
remedy serves primarily as a deterrent . . . .To require him to account for the gains of others still more
plainly operates to deter him and other fiduciaries
from disloyalty.182
While it is an interesting—and apparently unresolved—question
at what point (if ever) the agent’s profits might be so far removed
from the misappropriation of the principal’s resources, the
underlying principle of law is clear: to remove the temptation for an
agent to misappropriate a principal’s resources, the principal is
allowed to recover not only the value of the misappropriated
resources but also any profit made by the use of those resources.
E. The Agency Issue in Fame
When considering an agent who is famous, interesting questions
regarding the agent’s right to exploit that fame in an unrelated field
arise from agency law’s central principle that an agent owes a duty
of loyalty to a principal, and its two corollaries that (i) the agent must
prefer the principal’s interests to the agent’s own, and (ii) the agent
must refrain from using the principal’s resources for the agent’s
benefit even if such use does no harm to the principal.
Under general agency principles, agents may use their own
resources for their own purposes as long as they do not violate the
duty of loyalty, but agents may not use their principals’ resources
for their own purposes. However, it is unclear whether “fame” is a
resource belonging to the principal or the agent. Even if it is a
182

Id. at 1111–12 (citations omitted).
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resource belonging to the agent, to what extent can the principal
control use of that resource? While it is important to remember the
duty to act in the principal’s best interest, the more important duty
for purposes of analyzing fame is the duty to use the principal’s
assets solely on the principal’s behalf. Understanding how a famous
agent would exercise this duty requires determining precisely which
assets belong to the agent and which belong to the principal. Agents
are allowed to use their own assets, as long as they do not act
zadversely to their principals;183 agents may not use their principals’
assets for the agents’ purposes, even if those purposes are not adverse to the principals’ interests. The assets of interest for this Article are primarily the intellectual property rights discussed above.
Accepting the proposition that fame is a bundle of intellectual
property rights, the combined effect of which is to create wide—and
distinctive—recognition, the next step in the analysis is to examine
each of the components of that bundle, in order to identify which
are assets of the famous person and which are the assets of that person’s principal.184 Since the constraints on agents’ activities fundamentally relate to use of the principal’s resources, only those
components of fame (developed above in Section I) that belong
to the principal are of concern from an agency perspective. Determining whether there are constraints on a famous person’s use of
their fame, or whether control of such fame belongs to the famous
person’s principal requires returning to the analysis of ownership of
the components of fame and noting that there are broad categories
of situations in which this question arises.
Given that agency law primarily constrains use of the principal’s
assets for the benefit of the agent, it is important to distinguish those
cases in which the agent properly advances the principal’s interests
from those in which the agent uses the principal’s assets for self-

183

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“Although
an agent’s interests are often concurrent with those of the principal, the general fiduciary
principle requires that the agent subordinate the agent’s interests to those of the principal
and place the principal’s interests first as to matters connected with the agency
relationship.”).
184
Recall that the ultimate question is whether there are constraints on whether a famous
person may make use of that fame, or whether control belongs to the famous person’s
principal.
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benefit. For example, the analysis would differ for a famous ballplayer who poses for selfies at the ballpark owned by the team, i.e.,
the principal; a famous person who opens a restaurant using his own
name in order to capitalize on the fame he has accrued through an
activity unrelated to the restaurant; and someone who makes a
political statement that attracts attention not due to the reasoning it
articulates but rather due to the fame that the speaker already has.185
In each case, the question would be twofold: (1) whether the famous
person was using an asset that belonged to his principal, which
would require analyzing the nature of the asset being used and its
ownership in the IP context; and (2) whether the activity benefitted
the famous person, that person’s principal, or both—which is purely
a question of agency law.
VI. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS AND SAMPLE APPLICATIONS
As demonstrated above, fame is not a single right. Rather, it is a
bundle of rights potentially owned by different people. Analyzing
fame, therefore, requires identifying the component rights, who
owns them, and how they interact in a particular situation. Certain
situations may involve the question of which party is entitled to
money, but also may involve the question of availability of
injunctions to compel or prohibit actions. Intellectual property rights
are “exclusive” rights, meaning that they give the owner the right to
exclude others from using the protected rights.186 Therefore, there
will be situations where cooperation187 among multiple owners is
required or else the status quo (no action) will prevail.

185

See supra text accompanying note 1.
See supra Part IV.
187
See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006) (holding that
all intellectual property rights are intangible personal property and therefore can be
assigned or licensed. An alternative to cooperation is, of course, judicial compulsion
through injunctive relief). The traditional “four-factor” test for an injunction requires that
the plaintiff establish: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies
available at law are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that considering the
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted;
and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction. Id. at
391.
186
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A. Inherent Fame
Some people are famous ab initio. Examples would include heirs
to the throne of the United Kingdom, children of American political
dynasties, and children of famous performers. They are widely
recognized by virtue of who they are, even before they have done
anything noteworthy. In these cases, there are no agency relationships or copyright or patent issues to consider. Indeed, the only
intellectual property right that need even be considered is trademark.
These people possess an inherent fame that derives in part from a
famous last name, which became famous through the work of others.
B. Self-Developed Fame
In today’s world, where the Internet provides direct access to
wide audiences, individuals can develop fame without any
institutional apparatus or industry professionals to support them.
Examples would include bloggers who develop an audience by
creating their own content and posting it directly, self-published
authors, and self-published musicians.188 This category is arguably
even simpler than the inherent fame category, because there is no
issue over the ownership of any trademarks: there is only one
potential claimant. Therefore, in the absence of any agency or nontrademark intellectual property constraint,189 self-developed fame
should be free for use in any manner that the famous person chooses.
C. Assisted Fame
“Assisted Fame” is the broadest category—i.e., fame which
attaches to an individual, but is the result of a group effort. Examples

188

Even this requires the use of third-party tools, but these tools may be acquired by
contract without creating a principal-agent relationship or any other duty to the supplier.
One example would be the use of YouTube or a similar service to distribute a video. While
there may be no contract negotiation, the relationship is governed by YouTube’s terms of
service. See, e.g., Terms of Service, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/static?template=
terms [https://perma.cc/DV2Q-P9NK]. Another example would be the use of a web hosting
service. See, e.g., Terms of Service, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, https://aws.amazon.com/
service-terms/ [https://perma.cc/2EW7-9W4S].
189
Of course, even a famous person must respect all rights belonging to others. The
following analyses only consider rights directly related to the creation of that element of
fame under consideration and not to other components which may be necessary to develop
fame.
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would include performers backed by studio productions, athletes
backed by team organizations, and authors backed by publishers.
In each case, an organization (often one with long experience and
assets developed for the creation of fame) selects an individual possessing talent and develops that talent at the organization’s expense.
Fundamentally, two sets of factors are involved in developing
Assisted Fame. First, the organization brings its own intellectual
property, which is helpful in establishing the individual’s fame
because it associates the individual with an already famous entity.
For example, since MGM is a famous studio,190 starring in an MGM
film can confer fame on an otherwise unknown performer.191 Rights
issues do not arise to the extent that the organization is using its own
intellectual property on its own behalf, for example, in marketing
the movie. However, marketing the movie incidentally contributes
to the development of the performer’s fame, which in turn raises the
question of who owns the new bundle of rights comprising the
performer’s fame.
This observation brings us to the second factor. The organization
contributes its “star-making” machinery, its publicity skills, and its
contacts. The individual celebrity-in-the-making becomes, in effect,
the agent through which all this machinery belonging to the principal operates. Again, as long as the agent is acting on the principal’s
behalf, such as by marketing the movie, the principal-agent relationship will not become problematic. However, complications related
to fiduciary duties do arise if the performer uses the newfound fame
in another venture.
Conversely, the performer’s personal skills may be an independent source of intellectual property rights. If so, the performer’s own
IP rights would counterbalance the organization’s claims to the
fame, as the agent would arguably be using her own assets, not the
principal’s. This configuration of rights may negate the agency

190

Even the MGM lion is famous. See Kat Escher, The Story of Hollywood’s Most
Famous Lion, SMITHSONIAN (Apr. 17, 2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smartnews/mgms-first-lion-didnt-roar-180962852/ [https://perma.cc/32NM-REX5].
191
See, for example, Julia Roberts or Matt Damon in MYSTIC PIZZA (MGM 1988), Aaron
Eckhart in IN THE COMPANY OF MEN (MGM 1997), or Jeffrey Wright in BASQUIAT (MGM
1996).
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rule preventing agents from using the principal’s assets for the
agent’s benefit.
D. Group Fame
This category includes fame associated with a group of people
rather than the individuals who make up the group. Examples would
be bands or dance troupes. While each may have a standout performer, other performers in the group would be unrecognizable
to the general public except as part of the group.192 The issues are
similar to those in the Assisted Fame category, except that no
organization outside the group can claim ownership of the jointly
developed intellectual property or rights as a principal under
agency theory.
E. Fungible Fame
This category includes individuals who become famous, not
through any personal skill or attribute, but simply by being in the
right place at the right time. Examples would be game show
contestants and reality show participants. In these cases, there is a
famous role, but it does not matter who plays that role—it is the role
itself that is famous. The analysis is similar to that set out above in
respect of the Assisted Fame category, except that the individual’s
own skills are a greatly diminished, or even absent, factor—thus
supporting the broadest possible ownership by the principal.
VII. APPLICATION
While media coverage of conflicts between famous people and
the organizations for which they work, or which otherwise fulfill the
role of a principal, has tended to focus on the First Amendment
rights of the performer,193 the coverage has often failed to recognize
192

For example, individual members of the Alvin Ailey Dance Troupe or the Blue Man
Group likely cannot be named or identified by the general public; instead, they are
generally recognized only by their respective group names.
193
See, e.g., Travis Waldron, Does Colin Kaepernick Have A First Amendment Case
Against Donald Trump?, HUFFINGTON POST (June 5, 2018), https://www.huffpost.com/
entry/kaepernick-trump-first-amendment-nfl-national-anthem_n_5b15b680e4b093ac33a0
f94c [https://perma.cc/6HYE-BPGJ] (suggesting that Colin Kaepernick sue President
Trump and the NFL for violating his First Amendment rights); Daniel Victor, Obama Says
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that the First Amendment is a constraint on government action:
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”194 The Constitution does not guarantee an absolute
license to speak195 or to use others’ facilities to do so. Private parties
are at liberty to constrain actions, even those that are constitutionally
guaranteed against government constraint.
The theory advanced in this Article that fame is a bundle of
intellectual property rights allows us to resolve the tension that often
arises between different parties’ claims of entitlement to control the
famous person’s use of that fame.196 The first step is to identify the
type of fame involved, which in turn permits identification of which
intellectual property rights are involved. Each of the involved
intellectual property rights is then analyzed to determine its owner.
If the famous person owns that right, there are no constraints on that
person’s use. If, however, the use involves a property right
belonging to another, resolution requires no more than application
of basic rules of intellectual property.
For example, if a professional football player calls a press
conference and shows up in “civilian” clothes to discuss social
issues, there is no constraint. While the type of fame operative in
this example is Assisted Fame—the football player would be
unknown but for association with the football team—the
professional is using his own property right; ultimately, the
professional’s individual fame determines whether or not reporters
will attend the press conference.
On the other hand, property rights owned by others are invaded
if the football player seeks the same publicity by making the same
Colin Kaepernick Is ‘Exercising His Constitutional Right’, N.Y. TIMES (Sept 5, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/06/sports/obama-colin-kaepernick-nationalanthem.html [https://perma.cc/LB37-K83C]; Kneeling Is a Form of Free Speech Protected
by the First Amendment, KY. KERNEL (Oct. 11, 2017), http://www.kykernel.com/
opinion/kneeling-is-a-form-of-free-speech-protected-by-the/article_64289330-aec2-11e7a02f-9b3e53103372.html [https://perma.cc/T9VF-HFJA].
194
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
195
Confidentiality agreements are a simple, but clear, example of the right of private
parties to limit speech.
196
All intellectual property rights are enforceable not only by actions for damages, but
also by injunctions in appropriate cases. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.
388, 390–91 (2006)..
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statement symbolically during a football game that is being televised
and watched not because of the personal fame of the player but
because of the public interest in the game. In this scenario, the
football player is harnessing Assisted Fame to send his message.
The resources he is using do not depend on his personal skills, and
so his own rights cannot support the right to make the symbolic
statement. To the contrary, he is exploiting the fame of the team and
of the game itself, and paraphernalia of those two fames (e.g. the
uniform)197—all of which are owned by the team, the NFL, and
perhaps other institutions such as the broadcaster, but certainly not
by the individual player. The audience is not there to hear what the
player thinks about political issues, but rather to watch the game—
a game that will unfold based in part on plays contained in the team’s
proprietary playbook. The player is acting as the agent of the team,
and the right to use the team’s assets is limited to uses on the team’s
behalf. Thus the same statement in a different context produces a
different result, and the player’s right to make the statement is
subject to the team’s control. The analysis would differ for someone
who had developed independent fame. For example, if a famous
actress were to stage a photo opportunity to publicize opposition to
a war,198 it would be necessary to determine whether she used any
assets belonging to her employer in the process. If she appeared in a
costume associated with a film character, that could infringe on the
employer’s rights. If she used nothing more than her own star power
to attract the media, she would be within her rights and under no
duty to seek approval from her employer.
More generally, use of an employer’s uniform for personal
purposes appears to be sufficient to constitute a violation of the duty
of loyalty. Reading v. Regem199 is a clear example not only of the
absolute rule regarding use of a principal’s resources for the agent’s
purposes, but also of the presumption that the use of an employer’s
197

See Reading v. Regem [1948], 2 KB 268 (Eng.) (holding that a soldier who wore his
uniform to facilitate smuggling was held to owe the government the proceeds of the
smuggling operation).
198
Colby Itkowitz, How Jane Fonda’s 1972 Trip to North Vietnam Earned Her the
Nickname Hanoi Jane, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2017 10:15AM), https://www.washington
post.com/news/retropolis/wp/2017/09/18/how-jane-fondas-1972-trip-to-north-vietnamearned-her-the-nickname-hanoi-jane/ [https://perma.cc/UKW3-9U7N].
199
See supra text accompanying note 167.
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uniform violates the duty of loyalty. Moreover, in Bridgeport
Guardians, Inc. v. Delmonte, the court upheld disciplining an officer
for “importuning, while in uniform, of a small business owner,
appearing to exploit the authority of his position for personal
gain . . . .”200 The officer had, while in his police officer uniform,
asked the owner of a hotdog stand for a $500 loan and “took four
hot dogs on two occasions . . . without paying” and also intimidated
a witness in connection with those actions.201 In addition, appearing
in uniform may also be evidence that, at the time an act took place,
the agent was acting as the principal’s employee.202 U.S. military
services prohibit appearing in uniform in connection with political
events, and Major League Baseball (rather than individual players)
controls the use of player uniforms in the production of trading cards
and the licensing of team logos on merchandise.203
Given that the issue of ownership of fame by definition involves
people who are aware of the value of publicity, the issue is likely to
be recognized and negotiated in the majority of cases. Especially
in cases involving professional athletes or performers, those negotiations will probably take place in the context of broader union
contracts. However, it is critical that those negotiating on behalf of
performers actually do recognize and address the ownership of fame
in those negotiations, because there is no intellectual property right
that confers an implied license to a performer when the underlying
right is owned by a third party. In situations where the issue has not
been negotiated, principals retain significant rights and the powerful
ability to control the actions of their famous agents, especially
when the action takes place during a principal-sponsored activity or
200

Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Delmonte, 2010 WL 5625647, at *3 (D. Conn. Dec. 30,
2010).
201
Id. at 1.
202
See generally Boehm v. U.S. Postal Service, No. 8:12-CV-198, 2013 WL 6002874
(D. Neb. Nov. 12, 2013) (in which a postal employee was disciplined for removing
undeliverable coupons for personal use and attempting to redeem them while wearing her
uniform).
203
U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, Instruction No. 1334.01, ¶ 3 (Oct. 26, 2005). Major League
Baseball controls logos through Major League Properties, Inc. See Legal Notices, MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL (2019), https://www.mlb.com/official-information/legal-notices
[https://perma.cc/H8GS-HNW3] (listing of intellectual property rights licensed through
Major League Properties, Inc.). Most professional sports leagues centrally own and license
logos.

2020]

FAME

491

involves use of a uniform or other device that associates the famous
agent with the principal.
CONCLUSION
When mass communications were expensive, the development
of fame generally required the resources and efforts of production
institutions. Those institutions typically were able to dictate policy
because they controlled access to the mass media and because
they—not the famous person—had the resources to reach the
general public. The technological trend toward cheaper avenues of
mass communication has weakened this practical control, thereby
increasing the importance of legal mechanisms of control. As
barriers to mass communication continue to fall, the opportunity for
commercialization of fame divorced from the institutions that
traditionally created fame will increase. This can be expected to
increase the gap between the interests of the principals who enabled
the creation of fame and the agents who embody the fame, and
therefore to increase the need to address issues of ownership of
intellectual property in a growing number and wider range of cases.
We have only seen the tip of the iceberg, and in the future, famous
individuals should be more cognizant of the issues regarding the IP
rights in their fame and aware of the need to negotiate for such
rights in agreements with the people and entities that help
make them famous.

